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Legalist Empire: International Law and 
American Foreign Relations in the Early 
Twentieth Century, by Benjamin Allen 
Coates1
WILLIAM HEISEY2
IT IS 1898. WITH ITS ACQUISITION of the Philippines following its rapid victory in 
the Spanish-American War and its gaze cast south to the emergent nation states 
of the crumbling Spanish Empire, America stands at the dawn of its century of 
worldwide dominance in international affairs. The Secretary of State, Richard 
Olney, calls on his fellow citizens to “shake off the spell of the Washington 
legend” and embrace the responsibilities of an interventionist great power.3
This is the time of the Progressive Era—when faith in the progress of 
‘civilization’ and scientific advancements both around the world and within 
America brought optimism to the ruling classes, who sought to implement 
dramatic social changes whilst firmly maintaining their reins on power.4 It is 
within this dynamic and emergent period in American political history that 
Benjamin Allen Coates frames his prodigious study of international law and 
1. Benjamin Allen Coates, Legalist Empire: International Law and American Foreign Relations 
in the Early Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
2. JD/MBA Candidate 2018, Osgoode Hall Law School and Schulich School of Business.
3. More specifically, the “spell” was a reference to the established American tradition of 
non-intervention in European affairs. See Coates, supra note 1 at 44.
4. See William A Link & Susannah J Link, eds, The Gilded Age and Progressive Era: 
A Documentary Reader (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).
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the legal profession. Building upon the author’s PhD research,5 Legalist Empire 
seeks to examine the development of international law in the early twentieth 
century and reveal how much of its development was linked to the emerging 
status of America as a Great Power. It is a story of contradictions and of conflict, 
of politicians and of academics, and of the “great game” played between global 
empires within which America became increasingly and reluctantly enmeshed. 
Although many histories of international law envision Woodrow Wilson’s plans 
for the League of Nations as the starting point of America’s engagement with 
international law,6 this book pushes the beginning of this engagement back 
several decades to the end of the nineteenth century, examining the confluence 
of international legal thinking in the years leading up to World War I.
Legalist Empire also provides a fresh account of the developing profession 
of international lawyers. It draws upon the correspondence of many influential 
professionals such as Elihu Root and John Bassett Moore and examines the 
proceedings of various budding international academic bodies like the American 
Society of International Law and the Institut de Droit International. Coates 
departs from more traditional accounts by explicitly recognizing that lawyers are 
“ideological actors as much as technical advisers”7 and goes further by examining 
more particularly how various social and cultural dimensions shaped the 
development of this emerging legal profession. As Coates acknowledges:
Washington embraces international law when its policymaking elite believes that 
doing so is consistent with national interests and compatible with national values. 
Since “interests” and “values” are neither static nor objective, it is vital to understand 
how social, cultural, and political conditions shape them.8
Indeed, it is this flexibility of international law to enforce contemporary 
political and social objectives that underpins much of Coates’ book. It is a 
tendency seen over the period analyzed in this book: the 1890s through to the 
aftermath of World War I. It is borne out, for example, in the application of 
General Orders No. 100: a code first written to guide the behavior of the Union 
Army during the Civil War, but subsequently adapted by international lawyers to 
5. See Benjamin Allen Coates, Transatlantic Advocates: American International Law and U.S. 
Foreign Relations, 1898-1919 (PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 2010) [unpublished].
6. See e.g. Ruth Henig, Versailles and After: 1919-1933, 2d ed, (London: Routledge, 1995) at 
9-13; Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations 
1920-1946 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) at 2; Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: 
Six Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2003).
7. Coates, supra note 1 at 50.
8. Ibid at 180.
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authorize the use of punitive reprisals against guerillas contesting the American 
occupation of the Philippines.9 In a very real sense, the instrumentality of 
international law betrayed its idealistic origins. As Coates observes, international 
lawyers “embodied an optimistic reformist sensibility that promoted national 
and class interests in the guise of universal values.”10
An additional heuristic element looms large in Coates’ analysis—the tendency 
of many policymaking elites of the Progressive Era to adopt the Kiplingian drive 
to assume the ‘burden’ of civilizing backward nation states and to employ it 
as a justificatory device behind the introduction of many substantial political 
interventions and legal developments. The profound integration of this concept 
in pre-Great War thought should not be underestimated. As Coates argues, “the 
internalizing of the concept of ‘civilization’, the way that legalists instinctively felt 
its truth, the way it appeared as inevitable as it was desirable: these were essential 
to the legalist mindset.”11
For example, in the public fallout from American maneuvering behind the 
secession of an independent state of Panama (which subsequently agreed to the 
construction of the Panama Canal on more unfavorable terms than offered before 
secession), it became vital that what had been done “be defended on definite 
legal ground.”12 Several reasons were promulgated upon this ground, including 
most notably that U.S. intervention was justified on the basis it had received “a 
mandate from civilization…in the interest of mankind.”13 Interestingly, while 
the more tortured traditional treaty interpretations were criticized, the populist 
appeals to a mandate for civilization proved highly persuasive.14
The power of ‘civilization’ to underpin and shore up otherwise dubious 
legal arguments was witnessed yet again in the case of the Philippines. As the 
applicability of General Orders No. 100 to the context of a colonial rebellion 
became increasingly questioned, the U.S. defense became that as ‘savages’ the 
Filipinos did not deserve the civilized treatment otherwise afforded to them under 
international legal norms.15 Even more intriguingly, Coates begins to explore (but 
does not expound further upon) the ‘imposition’ (or rather reception) of legalism 
in “dependent countries” in South America, arguing that in fact many elites of 
9. Ibid at 50.
10. Ibid at 61.
11. Ibid at 178-79. In this book review, “legalists” refers to the cadre of contemporary 
international lawyers that straddled both the professional and policy-making worlds.
12. Ibid at 56.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid at 57.
15. Ibid at 52.
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these countries openly embraced international law to prove their ‘civilized’ status 
in the eyes of the world in a sort of expression of cultural insecurity.16 This astute 
observation could have borne further investigation as it provides an interesting 
complement to the driving forces of civilizing ideology behind American 
interventions in the early twentieth century.17
These major themes are further illustrated by an examination of how 
the book and its various arguments unfold. In summary, at the beginning of 
the twentieth century American foreign policy was by tradition based upon 
three often contradictory values: isolation from European affairs, the Monroe 
Doctrine, and Manifest Destiny.18 It became increasingly difficult for America, 
given its rapid economic growth and increasing political clout, to reconcile these 
competing aims successfully. In response, Coates argues, international law arose 
as a tool to help with this reconciliation. A global legal infrastructure on American 
terms (namely, through the introduction of arbitration and a global court) could 
preserve non-entanglement yet allow for an “imperial international law” to 
satisfy the emerging needs of a new world power.19 Indeed, as one contemporary 
international law journal framed it, “[one] might almost say” that America is a 
“violent partisan…of international arbitration.”20
Legalism, Coates concludes, offered the solution. It provided the language 
and concepts that helped the United States to resolve a tricky ideological problem 
it faced in the early 1900s: How can a nominally and vocally anti-imperial 
republic become an empire at the same time?21 The role of the developing body of 
international lawyers and policymakers was central to this emergence of legalism 
underpinning American imperial ventures, as “to understand the working of 
international law it is necessary to understand the mental worlds and professional 
networks of the foreign policy establishment.”22
Coates begins Legalist Empire by surveying developments in international 
law in the United States at the end of the nineteenth century. He concludes that 
16. Ibid at 119-20.
17. There are interesting parallels to this receptive process in Romanization theory, which 
envisions a “creolized” negotiated identity whereby local elites willfully assumed dominant 
cultures to serve their own ends. See Jane Webster, “Creolizing the Roman Provinces” (2001) 
105:2 American Journal of Archaeology 209; David Mattingly, “Being Roman: Expressing 
Identity in a Provincial Setting” (2004) 17:1 Journal of Roman Archaeology 5.
18. Ibid at 25-26.
19. Ibid at 26, 38.
20. Ibid at 30.
21. Ibid at 83.
22. Ibid at 179.
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by 1898, the U.S. “had developed a tradition of promoting international law 
in order to maintain political non-entanglement” albeit without the European 
tendency to promote “overseas empire.”23 After 1898, however, constitutional 
and international law were seen as playing “important roles in making American 
empire possible,” enabling lawyers to connect “imperial actions to broader 
ideological claims grounded in discourses of civilization.”24 When confronted 
with public unease about overt American colonial ambitions, international 
lawyers presided over the “domestication” of international law in America, 
recasting the “civilizing mission” as America’s leadership of a global movement of 
justice and peace in the years leading up to 1914.25
This ideal manifested itself more concretely in America’s rise to become a 
leading proponent of the creation of a permanent international court—an ideal 
that came under attack during episodes of American intervention, such as in 
Panama.26 The arrival of Woodrow Wilson presented prima facie a “fundamental 
challenge” to legalism; however, as Coates demonstrates, Wilson’s pre-war term 
actually became more interventionist than its predecessors.27 The outbreak of the 
Great War proved a transformative moment in the development of the ideology 
of international law. Framing World War I as a “war for law,” international lawyers 
mobilized to turn public opinion against Germany, justifying ‘neutral’ America’s 
entry in 1917 as combatting the rise of illiberal and illegal “Prussianism.”28
Following the Great War, the powerful image of law’s role in the steady 
advance of ‘civilization’ had been irreparably shattered and a revival of the prewar 
legalist project had become impossible. Advancing international law would 
instead require commitment to supra-sovereign institutions—culminating in 
America’s advocacy of the embryonic League of Nations.29 This extensive history 
reveals most notably that the first decades of the twentieth century represented 
both a legalist age and an imperial one—law made empire possible and when the 
allure of empire waned the spread of international legal institutions stepped in to 
protect American overseas capital.30
The predominant tendencies of this book parallel those of Martti 
Koskenniemi, who similarly applies a contextual analysis to the development 
23. Ibid at 38.
24. Ibid at 58.
25. Ibid at 85.
26. Ibid at 106.
27. Ibid at 134-35.
28. Ibid at 150-51.
29. Ibid at 175-76.
30. Ibid at 178.
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of international law in the late nineteenth century.31 Central to Koskenniemi’s 
work is the notion of “sensibility,” which encompasses a set of attitudes and 
preconditions about international affairs related to the notion of “culture” and 
which structured the ways international lawyers thought and worked.32 This 
notion of “sensibility” is not dissimilar to Coates’ emphasis upon the notion of 
“civilization” as underpinning much of the early development of international 
law in America.33 Given that much of Koskenniemi’s focus is concerned with 
the Scramble for Africa and other European interventions (coupled with the 
legalistic justifications of European lawyers), Coates’ account helps to fill in 
gaps in the literature by applying a similarly contextual analysis of the legal 
reasoning behind American interventions in South America.34 It succeeds by 
complicating the development of international law over the late nineteenth 
century into the twentieth century so that it can no longer be envisioned as 
“classical” or “traditional” in the nineteenth compared with its “modernization” 
in the twentieth century.35 Indeed, as Coates concludes, the conventional binary 
interpretation of international law as requiring less empire and exceptionalism as 
requiring less international law is not borne out in his historical study.36
While Legalist Empire succeeds in complicating, its tone at times can 
also become laconic. Coates argues at one point that Theodore Roosevelt had 
decided that a combination of “government oversight, big capital, and East 
Coast professionalism represented the best way to maintain US hegemony,” but 
then eschews the challenge of elaborating upon these points in more detail.37 
Similarly, while the Great War is framed as a pivotal moment in the development 
of conceptualizations of international law (for example, by destroying the ideal 
31. The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See also Rein Müllerson, Book Review of 
The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 by Martti 
Koskenniemi, (2002) 13:3 Eur J Intl L 727.
32. Koskenniemi, supra note 29 at 727.
33. Antony Anghie has remarked upon the importance of the “civilizing mission” to the 
development of international law in great detail. See Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty 
and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
34. Coates notes that there are two “brief studies” of US international lawyers. See Carl 
Landauer, “The Ambivalences of Power: Launching the American Journal of International 
Law in an Era of Empire and Globalization” (2007) 20:2 Leiden J Intl L 325; Martti 
Koskenniemi, “The Ideology of International Adjudication” (Paper delivered at The Hague, 
7 September 2007) [unpublished].
35. David Kennedy, “International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion” 
(1997) 17:1 Quinnipiac L Rev 99 at 108.
36. Coates, supra note 1 at 178.
37. Ibid at 114.
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of “civility” for enforcing international legal judgments between countries), 
discussion of this conflict and America’s entry is confined to a relatively cursory 
sixteen pages.38 At times the discussion may have benefitted further from drawing 
deeper comparisons to contemporary legal developments in Britain—the 19th 
century was, after all, “Britain’s Century”39—and contrasts to British legal 
justifications of Empire might have provided additional insights into the legal 
reasoning underpinning American foreign policy decisions.
On the whole, Legalist Empire represents a striking and eminently 
well-researched account of the development of international law and international 
lawyers in America over the Progressive Era and beyond. It successfully 
problematizes the role of international law and legalist thinking in Empire—“for 
international law has long cast an imperial shadow, and even as Americans sought 
ways to avoid the chill, they imagined extending it to others.”40 It is satisfying that 
in conclusion the author begins to frame these implications within contemporary 
American interventions like the Iraq War. The legacy of Richard Olney exhorting 
fellow Americans to “shake off the spell of the Washington legend” is found alive 
and well today in George Bush’s response to Donald Rumsfeld’s suggestion that 
his Iraq adventure may not be in keeping with international law: “I don’t care 
what international lawyers say, we are going to kick some ass.”41 It is in this 
overt recognition of the instrumentality of international law and its grounding in 
the ideological motivations of its practitioners that Legalist Empire provides the 
reader with important lessons about how (and why) international law might be 
practiced today and into the future.
38. Ibid at 136-51.
39. WD Rubinstein, Britain’s Century: A Political and Social History, 1815-1905 (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 1998). Note however criticisms in Christopher Kent, Book Review 
of Britain’s Century: A Political and Social History 1815-1905 by WD Rubinstein, (2001) 
43:2 Victorian Studies 338. See also Susie L Steinbach, Understanding the Victorians: Politics, 
Culture and Society in Nineteenth-Century Britain (London: Routledge, 2012).
40. Coates, supra note 1 at 14.
41. Ibid at 177.

